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Introduction 
South Africa is, economically and militazily, by f a  the most 
powerful country in Africa south of the Sahara. !Phis means Wt it 
is much more thm one country among others. It would be bound in 
any circumstances to exert considerable influence on other Mxican 
countries, a d  p&icul;tply on those lying below the sixth p d l e l .  
South Africa's s i h t i o n  within Africa toda;y, however, is obviously 
quite unique. Its relations with other countries have been fas 
f m m  n o d ;  and the success of industrialization &dat p a t  
pover-ty Paises the danger of economic st-tion. Political 
isolation and the need for economic e v a s i o n  have combined to push 
the govement in- new directions. South Africa's special situation 
makes it almost inevitable that it should pursue an aggressive 
policy of expansion in Africa. This expansionism is bound t o  
become one of the moat important issues in African politics. 
The purpose of this paper is t o  examine certain aspects 
of South Africa's expansionism. I da not wish to review here the 
de-tails of its present foreigm policy; a great deal of the 
relevant material is common bowledge anyway. The task of 
gathering it towther is best left to a later paper. It seems 
much more important at this t h e  t o  try to describe the basic 
nature of South African expansionism. More important still, one 
must try to assess the consequencea f o r  other countries of the Bind 
of policy which South Africa is presently pursuing. The basic 
question is whether this policy w i l l  assist the development of poor 
aseas in southern Africa. This is the hope that lies behind the 
favourable reception wkich South Africa'a policy has had in certain 
countries, We need an analysis which will tell us: whether that 
hope is reasonable or not. 
Sou-bh Africats new policy towards Africa has two  
principal strands, One immediate aim of that policy is to expand 
t r a d e  and to fncmase economic relations with as many countries 
south of the S- as is possible. Thus South Africa is seek* 
trade agreements, offering loans, investing capital and proffering 
assistance, etc., im vaious countries. Zn th i s  way bo*h 
govement a d  business ar?e ~eeking to build n o m l  economic 
relations with those countries. The second inmediate aim of %he new 
policy i s  t o  c rea te  a Common Market in southem Africa. This 
involves a muck hi&er degree of economic i n t e ~ t i o n  with 
surrounding countries. For it means moving, by steps perhaps, 
towards a general co-ordination of economic policy among the 
countries involved, This paper will be concerned only with the 
latter aspect of South African expansionism. For the plans f o r  the 
Common Market t e l l  us a m e a t  deal about what South Africa expects 
i ts  role in Africa to be. They also tell us a meat deal. about the 
prospects f o r  development in the sub-continent as w e l l  as in ofhe2 
a e a s  which are likely t o  come under the influence of a South African 
bloc of nations,  
Countries within southem Africa a r e  very much overshadowed 
by their powerful neighbour. Nmy of them are actually controlled 
politically by South Africa. Certainly they are all dependent upon 
that country in one or another, But they have hitherho retained 
sepasate political identities. South Africa's plans far the axea are 
c a s ~ y i n g  politically independent countries towards economic 
i n t e m t i a n .  The question we m a t  ask is what this will mean. Will 
South Africa dominate the sea? Will significant economic integTation 
undemine the political independence other countries have mmged ta 
hold on to? It is impossible to avoid the suspicion that a proper 
economic analysis w i l l  show that o u r  political categories are quite 
mjsleding. And t h i s  is nowhere m o r e  apparent than in the case of .m 
economic d o n  between weak states and powerful ones. 
It is taken f o r  -tea here that very little needs to be 
said about the broad motives behind South Africa's new policy. 
"Dialoguefl, explahed trade relations, etc. ,  are pas t  af an effort  t o  
secure the polit ical .  s ta tus  quo in Africa south of the Sahaxa, to 
prevent any confl ict  over apa~theid which m i & t  undermine that status 
B. There is a further motive, already mentioned, which m y  need 
some explanation. South Africa now has a highly developed, if not 
altogether self-sufficient, industrial system. But its domestic 
markets are limited aa a consequence of the poverty of the mass of 
the population. Since %he etability of the economy is dependent upon 
an abiliw to increase sales of output, economic stagnation is a r e d  
m r .  The classic solution to this problem, at least fox a time, 
is t o  expand expods  of goods and of capitd.  South Africa is now 
attempting to create the politicd. conditions wbich wAll make that 
possible. 
The Idea of a Common Mazket fox Southem Africa 
A Common M k e t  fox southern Africa wae suggested by Prime 
Ws-ber Verwoerd some ye- ago, It has been discussed a good deal 
recently. m e  most systematic exposition of the ideas behind it and 
the policies f o r  b r a  it jnto being has been presented 5x1 the 
f imt publication of the Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis in 
Pre to r i a  (~ecember 1968). EL The Concept of Economic Co-operation in 
Southern Africa, L o m b d ,  Stadler and Va;n der Merwe discuss the need 
f o r  planning the development; of the econow of the whole sub-continent 
They suggest that malawi, Rhodesia, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, S o u a  Africa, South West mica,  and 
%he b t u s t a n s  of %he Bepublie should be regarded, far  ecoraomic 
purposes, aa p&s of a single southern African system. This 
aystem, which has also been called the "Third Africaf1, wouild have 
an area of  2 million square miles, a populakion of 45 million, and 
enormous ecol.romic resomcea. 
Blf of the coun~xies of the projected aystem m, of 
course, already 1inZced ~ 5 t h  South Africa in  a vaxiety of wqs. But 
some remain relatively independent politically. Moreover, it is 
obviously very odd that Zambia should be considered a p& af any 
"system" which mj&t involve political msociation w i t h  South 
Africa. The loose relations of the present, however, are not- 
but a s t a r t i n g  paint f o r  discussion md planning. The idea put 
f o r w a d  by South African experts and politiciaas is that everybody 
in the asea would benefit  by co-ordinated attempts to promote 
economic development in the whole area, It is therefore in 
everybodyvs intemsts to move towards a much greater economic 
integration of the m i o w  territories. The first step jn that 
d5rection is referred to as l'systematic co-operationt'. .S 
d l o w s  the countries involved to maintain their political 
independence while working together t o  achieve development. No 
country ha8 t o  sumender my of its sovereignty. A91 X- free 
t o  conclude m h  agreements as seem profitable to them. 
tlSystematic CO-opemtion" would themfore invo2ve the 
conclusion of ad weements on trade, tariffs, inves-hent, aid,  
br&~astructnm, etc. The fact that the whole policy of regional 
co-operation remains f o r  the present on a n  ad hoc basis m&es the 
whole idea more attractive t o  independent countries. It i s  very 
doubtful whether the South Africans would get anywhere if f&y 
proposed any kind of f u l l .  economic union for southen Africa at 
this point. But it is clem t h a t  South African p l a m e ~ s  m e  aiming 
at  a significant & e w e  of economic integration. They note, f o r  
instance, that protection (by tasiffs) would h a ~ e  to Irt&e place 
w i t -  a broad overd l  plan for the sub-re&on as a whole, with the 
very positive co-operation of the Republic of South Afr&cau (LSV, 
p. 34). Implicitly, the case which is made is one f o r  economic 
b t e g m t i o n  , 
LSV does not actually propose any f u l l  economic union in 
southern Af'rica. But it discusses what, in effect, could o n l y  be 
a fairly integrated economic region. It takes the creation of 
anp1oymen-b opportunities throughout the area as one of the maia 
problems to be dealt with. In a region of very poor com-l;rriea, 
action to create employment opportunities eve-ere muld require 
a high degree of c*operation. It a l s o  discusses the problem of 
reducing regional dependence on the rest of the world and jnc~eashg 
.inLra-regZond trade. Most importantly, it devotes some space to 
the psoblem of a common investment policy for promoting development, 
and elaborates a m b e r  of criteria accordbg to which funds would 
be guided t o  the -as where they are needed. The South Africans 
may pay homage t o  the nicetiea of &iplomacy. Their real concern, 
however, is with working out a coherent policy for promoting a 
c e r t a k  kind of development in southern Africa as a whole. They 
clemly believe, furkhelmom, that they can persuade or coerce 
others to co-operate wjth t h e i ~  p l m ,  
There is already a, solid basis f o r  a future southern 
African bloc. Sou-th Africa is to some extent only fomalizing 
arrangements which already exist. Trade within the region is 
- w i n g  rapidly; so is South African investment. Most countries h t  
the region dependent economically on South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland have no choice but t o  co-operate. Angola and 
kzambique w i l l  do so willingly, Rhodesia haa chosen the path or" 
South Africa on its own - or at least those who hold power have 
chosen. None the less, the asrangements proposed by South Afxica 
will produce significant chages. They will lead to a kind of  
mtional izat ion of ecommic policies thro~&out the area. They w i l l  
undoubtedly help to promote a certain kind of economic growth. They 
will greatly stmngkhen the political ties between countries in the 
-a; and. a much more unified southern Africa will mean a n e a t l y  
strergbhened South mica .  Will this unification create real 
#angem f o r  independent Africa? 
Alternative Stratedes for Economic Development 
I: ought to B=, first  of al l ,  what I: mean by lrecon~mic 
development7'. 31 setting out t h i s  definition I am r e d l y  do* no 
more than s ta t ing  the  obvious. But th is  def ini t ion is not, in 
practice, accepted by economists. They tend t o  equate p w t h  wi- th  
development. 3ut it is no longer po~ls ible  to accept this equation aa 
valid - if it ever was. M e  confusion af the two terms obscures the  
main is~ues. The main objective of "developmentw must be the 
elimination of poverty in the sense of the lack of basic necessities 
f o r  the mass of the population in my country. Thus gmwth, with the 
reduction of income and consumption inequalities be,comes ~e basic 
cr i te r ion  f o r  assessing the p r o v e s s  of poor cowtries. "Developmenttt 
therefom implies a c e d a i a  content in ttpwbh"'. 
It must be recogxized that there is no such thing as "just 
@owtkf'. The concept of ttmtiona3. product4' is shorthasd. It i s  a 
way of describkg the " m i x H  of goods and services produced in the 
econclmy. But my economy can produce different mixes. The 
composition of output can be of one kind or of another. What goods 
an economy produces is obviously of crucial importance. It is 
therefore misleading to tdk about growth alone. The impor'tant 
question is what kind, of growth takes place. When output grow, it 
paws h parbicular.wa;ys. Additions t o  output mean more of some 
goods or more of othem. X* may involve some altogether new mods. 
Grow-th thus entails qwtitative and qualitative changes k output. 
Broadly speaking, therefore, we may distinguish different paths of 
economic growth. An economy may p w  in different directions, 
producing different mixes of goods, 
One M h e r  point needs emphasis here. The 
conventional view is that consumers somehow determine what asz 
economy produces. !Phis is arrant nonsense. This idea derives from 
#e RO-called "statictt theory of value or allocation. (The tfstaticll 
world is a fipent of the economistf s imagination.) It cannot be 
applied to an economy in which p w t h  is talc* place. When we 
look at growth, it is clear that the choice of w h a t  to produce 
takes place in two atages. There is, first, a producerfs choice 
about what kinds of facilities to invest h. Th5e predetermines or 
limits whatever choices consumem may have. Investment decisions 
a r e  therefore af crucial importance in detemining the directions 
of economic gmtrth. Produceral choice plays an e~lpecially 
important mle h shaping the growth o f  poor econorniea today. 
There i s  another factor  which i s  commonly neglected h 
the  e s i a  of development. The most hportant element in 
shapimg the g~owth of an economy, o r  of a region, i~3 often -the 
aocial system itaelf. Most societies a r e  s t i l l  hieramhically 
s t r u c h e d .  The dislxibution of income, wealth, and opportunities 
is unequal. Orme of the most important material reflections of +,be 
"sgstemll in this sewe is the distribution of income. The 
distribution of income defines the initial conditiom in which m y  
development strategy must be pwsued. These conditions conatrain 
growth in the same way that graviGy constrains the flight of a 
rocket. In a m k e t  econonqy, inequalities i n  the &stribuf2on o f  
income can have a major influence on the composition of output. 
They can, therefore, shape the path of powth  no matter what 
lvstxategyt' i& pussued. 
There are basically two strategies fox economic gmwh.  
The first consists in expanding production facilities far basic 
necessities before myth ing  else. Such a s t rategy implies m 
initial e m p h i s  on heavy mufacturj-ng production t o  provide such 
f a c i l i t i e s  and t o  create t h e  infrastructure which is necessazy for 
industrialization. For a poor country, this s txa tem entails 
conaiderable self-re~traint at the begimiag  o f  the effort to 
"devel-optv. L- consumption an3 unnecessary government 
expenditure interfere w i t h  rapid indwtrialization. Such a 
strategy a lao  implies greater attention to domestic pmduction as 
distinct f r o m  proauction for export, The reward, of course, is that 
basic consumer goods can eaaily be made available to everyone. Thia 
strategy preaupposea a willinppess to accept a high depee of 
equality. V e r y  few countries in the world today are pwsuing, or 
even contemplating, such a stratea. But then the general situation 
of poor countries is that they are becoming poorer. 
The second stratem is a very dLfferent one, It is  based 
on the implicit acceptance of a fairly high degree of inequality in 
the dis t r ibut ion o f  income and wealth. And %his is typical of the 
poor economies in the c a p i t d i e t  o rb i t .  Since pmducers sell for 
pro f i t ,  they must seek m k e t s  where there is spend* pow-er from 
the ~t&. G r o w t h  +Aces place a t  the point where there is tTdemandtt. 
Production of relatively expensive goods i s  put before the 
pmduction of basic commodities f o r  the poor. This kind. of growth 
involves continuous jrulovatlon f o r  a relatively small proportion of 
the population and the introduction of new consumption goods before 
the o l d  ones aze available e~euytrhem. Once this process begins it 
tends t o  feed upon i tself,  that is ,  to reproduce i tself .  Over the 
long run, a l l  incomes tend t o  rise but incomes differences remzkin 
the same or grow; and m, as in. the  Dnited States ,  can be l e f t  in 
poverty. 
There a r e  thus %WO paths 09 g~owbh wbich'a poor econonry 
follow. The relevant point here is that the degree of 
hequal i ty  in the distribution of income wTl1 b v e  an enomous 
influence, by an invisible and "automatickv process, h deteminhg 
whjch path of wwth  a n  economy w i l l  pursue. The more unequal the 
distribution of income, the s e a t e r  will be t h e  tendency to produce 
g o d s  for the well-off. l31 a capitalist economy th is  tendmcy is 
very marked. Resources will be attracted to markets where there is 
xeady purchasing power. More pnticularly,  they w i l l  be attracted 
to the kinds o f  production wMch offer the highest profits. Where 
income distribution is hi&y unequal, economic growth tends to 
become palm, The same tendency may be seen i n  the economic.gcowt;h 
of Great Britain toda;y, Consider the case of Scotland a d  the 
South-East. Centres of ,mwth tend t o  attract resources and t o  g m w  
rapidly. ~~ axeas tend to Lose resources and to s t w a t e ,  
There is consequently a strong bias ~ i n s t  "developmenttt, 
in the sense in which I have used the tern, in m y  area where them 
is widespread pove*. Southem Africa is a striking case in point .  
Res~wces a r e  not being directed into the production of facilities 
f o x  providing basic necessities t o  the mass of the population. This 
I anti-development bias is reinforced by a pecul iar  characteristic o f  
I the capital which leaves wealthy areas seeking profitable employmeslt. 
AS3 -he  production of wealtm regions, or poles, increases, they need 
i mope and more raw materide.  So much of the  cap i ta l  which leavea i Europe fox Africa and South Africa fox, say, Zambia gpes into the 
exploitation of mineral resources, wiculhzre  or r a w  mater2ds 
production. This is because, with thriving metropolitan centres as 
markets, these sectors aare him profitable.  But, once again, 
this tendency sets up a bias a@nst development in the proper sense 
of the word. 
The S t m c b  of the Southern African Economy 
Taken ae a whole, southern Africa is almost a IgpicaJ 
underde~eloped area. It is unusually rich in resources. It is i spazsely populated. (The poor comtriea of Asia are perhaps a 
exception to the rule.)  Yet, it is on the whole quite poor. Only 
those who live anti work in the white enclaves are well off. The 
typical mual per capita hcome f o r  a country in the sub-continent 
is in the order of %25-£30; and that figure does not really reflect 
the reality of material at&& f o r  most Africans in +he area. 
The ~~t sector of the econoq, w i t h  the exception of South 
Africa, is px- pmduction. The vast majority of the population 
live on the land. There is no real industry outside Rhodesia aYld 
south' Africa; and, with the exception of these are-, the region 
i s  economically stagmat. To the extent that production is 
increasing, it increases f o r  the export market, 
The econnmies of the region have been dom-ted a;nd 
shaped by i t s  relations with developed countries. AJ.1 these 
countries were colonies until very recently, and their economies 
have a structure which tq-pically reflects that experience. They 
have been shaped by the needs of production fo r  the e q o r t  masket 
and by the intrusion of foreigm capital. They axe enomously 
dependent upon exports, and they must import the great buJ.k of 
manufactured proaucts and investment goods. Most economies in the 
region rest on production of very few commodities. Zambia gets 
93 per cent of  i ts export revenues fmm sales of copper. 
-Za 
gets 70 per cent of i t s  revenue f r o m  coffee and diamond expor ts .  
Malawi earns 75 per cent 05 f o r e i e  pmceeds from tea, tobacco and 
oilseeas. What skills and capital these a e a s  have are thus 
allocated t o  wes which do little to fhrther development. This 
happens because the presence of foreign capital m played a 
crucial mle in shilp5ng the reg3.onal economy. In many respects t h e  
econorqy of the region is little more than an appendage of the 
economies of a few western countries. 
South Africa, and to some extent Rhodesia, are anomalies 
in the sub-contbelzt. South Africa's wealth and industry make It 
mch more like B r i t a i n  or the United States than like Wawi or 
Zambia. And South Africafs relations with other countries in the 
sub-continent, and indeed with the Bantustans, are very much l ike 
southern Africafs relations with the developed countries. South 
Africa imports food and r a w  materials and exports m2tnufwtured goods. 
South Afrlcan capital flows t o  the backward azeas f o r  the purlpose of 
organizing primasy production or setting up facilities to p r o c e ~ s  
food or rawmaterials. k some cases, it creates facilities f o r  
producing inexpensive consumer goods. If the essence of neo- 
colonialism is the domixation of newly independent 'territories by 
economic power, then South Africa is clearly beconing a surrogate 
imperzd power within southern Africa. Power may be veiled by the 
categories of econonies. But it is there, South Africa alseady has 
p e a t  influence on countries within the region. That hfluence is 
Likely to g m w .  
It will be u s e m  to examine some of the figures which 
suggest the extent of South Africa's influence in the area. Good 
data are r e d l y  qujte s c a c e .  There are, however, some estimates of 
trade and capital  flows, and these are probably among the most 
important chaxmels of influence between the South African centre 
and t h e  southern African periphery. South African, cap i td ,  firstly, 
already plays a crucial role in the sub-continent. Accordimg to one 
recent e s t a t e ,  the total of foreigsz investment in the southern 
African periphery is approxbately £550 million (mumay and Stoneman, 
'Trivate Overseas Tirves-tment in Southern and CentmL Africa'', 
197'0) , Kos t fo re ign  investment in the sub-continent is, of course, 
in South Africa i tself ,  but a substantial portion is in t h e  
periphery. South A f r i c a n  investment in the periphery is almost as 
large. It probably now t o t a l s  well over W25 million. ~~ and 
Stone- estimate £375 million, but their  figures have not been 
updated. 1 
The distribution of .these investments (direct and 
indirect) is m- as fo l lom:  
South West Africa - $96 million in 1.963 (a5 
least E125 m i l l i o n  now) 
Rhodesia 
Zambia - $245 million in 1966 (at 
least E280 million now) 
Plllgola & Mozambique E10 million (a low 
estimate) 
Botswana, Leao-ho 6: 
Swmiland £25 million 
The estimzbte of a total of g425 million probably errs on the side of  
consematism. It assumes l i t t l e  disinvestment in Zambia and WawL, 
a d  a comensating growth of new hveslments which brings the azmual 
increase fox the fomer Federation to 4 per cent per yeas. South 
Africa inveshent in Ihodesia has probably increased much more 
mpidly. South African assets probably represent a signifzcant 
portion of  the t o t a l  of productive asaets outside the subsistence 
sector of the sub-continent. This means that  South Africa, thro@ 
national and dti-national  enterprises, has significant control 
over the use of l o c d  resources in the periphery. South A f r i c a n  . 
companies can h a ~ e  considerable influence aver the rate and pattern 
of  investment in most parts of +hat periphery. Thia means that the 
n o b l l y  independent gwernruents of the periphery must treat South 
African interests with caze. And that is putting it rather mildly. 
But it gives some idea of: the concrete m e w  of dependency 
The countries of the peripheq are also  dependent upon 
South Africa f o r  imports a3ld exports. The region's trade is, of 
course, oriented towa;rds developed countries. Intrakregianal e 
expods m e  only 28 per cent of the sub-continentvs exporta t o  the 
rest of the world. Tnt=~gZona l  imports constitute only 25 per 
cent of the suk-centinmt~s total imports. Within the region, 
however, South Africa holds a dominant position. Malawi, Zambia, 
Botswana, bsotho,  Swaziland and South West Africa are heavily 
dependent upon the Republic f o r  imports.  Rhodesia, Lesotho, 
l Botswana, Swaziland and South West Africa are heavily dependent upon export mazkets there. In other words, the countries in the 
periphexy are closely tied t o  South Africa by their tsade needs. 
The principal exceptions ase m l a  and Mozambique, This gives -the 
Republic considerable leverage over the governments in question, 
Doubters need only consider w h a t  happens in Canada when the United 
States govement t h a t e n s  to c h g e  taxiff arrangements on 
manufactured products. 
What i s  perhapa more important i s  that the content of 
trade between South Africa a d  the  periphery reflects the Q-pical 
pattern of relations between developed a d  underdeveloped azeas. 
South Africa is an industrial power. I t s  exports to the developed 
countries do not yet reflect W8 new status. They still consist, 
to.= important d e w e ,  of primargr commodities. South Afxicars 
trade with Africa, however, and with the periphery in particulm, 
is very much a part  of the usual pattern. It exports mufackumd 
mods, machinew, and t rmspor t  equipment. Tn returm, it receives 
food and raw materials. The expor t  lists of Mozambique, Botswana, 
Swaziland and. Zambia me typical of those in countries on the 
periphery . 
Botswana - cattle (camasses), hides, meat extract 
Mozambique - cashew nuts, cotton, sugar, tea, copxa, 
petroleum products 
Swaziland - i m n o r e ,  sugar, asbestos, wood pulp, 
citrus fruits, meat 
Zambta - copper, zinc, lead, cobalt ,  tobacco. 
This sigaificance of W s  pattern is not diff icult  to easp. The 
continued specidieation of the periphery i n  primary production is 
aa obstacle t o  development. So trade re la t ions  w i t h  South Africa, 
the expansion of which will reinforce that obstacle, stand in the 
way of t ha t  qualitative shift in the pat tern of production which i s  
necessary for l'develepment 'l, 
One M h e r  point about the present pattern of trade h 
the subcontinen-h needs paxticular emphasis. The history of trade 
between rich countries and poor shows that the terms tr ied betweem 
the 4x0 have caused great losses t o  the latter. The prices of 
manufactured exports have tended to rise continuou~ly. The prices of 
primary exports, on the other b a d ,  have tended to decline more o r  
less continuously, The trend, £mm the point of view of the poor 
countries, has been to&s a continuous deterioration in .the t e r n  
of trade; and this h meant r e d  losses. Um(=TBD has estimated 
that the poor countries have l o s t  hundreds of mil l ions  of dol lass  
every ye= as a r e a t  of these price movements. Over a ten-yea 
period, it has been estjmated that these losses were equivderd to 
more than 40 per cent of all the aid gmnted t o  poor countries, 
Ekqansion of present trade relations between South m i c a  and the 
rest of the sub-continent does not, h consequence, of fe r  great 
hope for accelemtjng: the development of backward areas. On the 
conkazy, it might w e l l  slow down development, through its fina;ncial 
consequences as well as by i ts  effects on the structure af 
production, 
N i g a t o r y  laboux obviously plays an important role in the 
subcontixentts economy. Hundreds of thousandrj of workers f r o m  ~e 
periphery work in South Africa, Rhodesia has nearly time hundred 
thowand m i g m t o q  workers. In 1960, according to Ken Owen, foreigm 
Africans constitu-bed neaxly 8 per cent of the t o t d  African 
population o f  Soutb Africa. Nearly 40 per cent of the workem jn 
the gold mines and in the coal mine8 in that year were f o r e i p  
Africans. More than 7 million vnon-residentslt now l ive  and work i n  
white South Africa. This enormous migration of labour i s  clearly a 
re f lec t ion  of the pover* in the periphery, where there ase v e q  few 
jabs to be had, It also,rer" leets  an important degree o f  dependency 
on the part af #e pert-phery, f o r  the income of  countries in the 
periphery is derived in p a t  f r o m  the remitted e a m i q y  of mi-ant 
workers, Malawi,  f o r  instance, is able to generate no more tkan 64 
per cent of its national income by local production. In other  
words, rimy countries can scazcely afford to do without the earnings 
provided by m i g r a n t  workers. And this w i l l  be true even in the  case 
of Mozambique, which derives 7 per cent o f  its nat ional  income from 
migrant earnings. The l ivelihood of such countries is thus 
dependent on a pattern of labour use and on fiscal arrangements 
which axe'largely determined South Africa. 
MB description of the structure of the sub-continent t s  
econow gives some idea of the way in which obvious differences 
betrareen South Africa and the periphery affect the pattern of economic 
a c t i ~ i *  h the *ale area, ]Flows of capital give South Africa 
control of resources in the periphery. The pat tern of t rade f l o w  
tends t o  impoverish the periphergr. The pa t te rn  of labom flows 
emichex South Africa and deprives the periphery of aome of i ts 
resources, kdeed of the m a t  bulk of skilled and aemi-skilled 
workem, These differences a r e  all reflections of differences in 
wealth. And,in the finaL a m l y ~ i s ,  it is these differences which 
w i l l  be the dete- factor 5n shaping the pat te rn  o f  development 
in the whole area. The maxs of  the African population live in 
poverty, The monthly per capita income of wkitea in South Africa 
is twelve times that of the average Afxican. The population of the 
reserves within South Africa is probably living on the border o f  
s tarvat ion most of the time. Average per capita income in +he 
periphery i s  probably less than tha t  of the average A f r i c a n  in South 
kT'rj.cx. (That i S a statisticail average. ) The econoq of the s n h  
continent, in other  word^, is a clmsic dual econolqy. And in 
asseasing- the prospects for nde-velopmkntv it is neceseary to 
recognize that this is the  context in which the development ef for t  
w i l l  be maae. 
ZTke Recent Paktern of Economic Growth jm tne Skih-Continent 
In recent years foreign c a p i t d  has been moving rapidly 
i n to  the sub-contiaent. Much of this capital has entered as direct 
investment, That is, foreign corpomtiona have gone into production 
there %hemselves, or Fn partnership with local cap i td .  It is 
prkaazily the lmge multi-national corporations which have been 
undertaking new invea-tment . The importance o f  small-scale 
enterprise has declined, paxticulazly in the fields of finance 
merchantiag. The r e g i o n a l  and sectoraL pattern of this kves-t;ment 
pmvides some indication af what i s  l ikely to happen i n  the asea in 
the future. If the mb-conthent becomes more fully integmted, 
m k e t  forces will plw a pmamouat role in  hap ping the pattern af 
developmGnt. Tbe future w i l l  not bring amy great qualitative changes. 
The future pattern of k m s - h a t ,  which i s  one of the decisive 
factors in development, is likely ta be very much Like the pattern 
of the l a a t  decde. So h t  experience is worth e-.
It is obvious that, over the last decade, the great bulk 
of investment in the region has gone to South Africa, By 1968 
foreign inveshent in South Africa had reached £2,319 million, 
These figurea aclude jnves-hent in the former Bigh Cammjssion 
Territories, tnzt the figures f o r  those areas are very d l .  The 
figures f o r  the remainkg countries h the periphery are not 
altogether reliable. But it is unlikely that f o r e i g n  inpeshent 
there was in the order of E550 million, as indicated previously, 
Thus, foreign inveslment in South Africa was between 80 and 85 per  
cent of the total f o r e i s  investmen% in $he sub-continent, It is 
difficult t o  sagr whether tbis proportion has been charging 5x1 recent 
yeaxs, but it is not Likely that it  ha^. If mything, a larger 
proportion has pmbahly been flowing into South Africa. The centre, 
in other words, has probably become relatively more attractive 
d u r i n g  the l a s t  decade. There are some sigms that th i s  may be 
slightly. The chamges, however, would be mm- ones 
which would not really affect the relative economic power of the 
periphery via-&via South Africa. 
The sectoral pattern of invea-hnent tends to confirm one's 
swpicions about %he way the logic of the market place tends t o  work 
itself out je an azea like southern Africa. Within South Africa, 
there has been a relative decline of mining. P o r e i g  j nveshen t~  
have gone hreashgly into the manufacturing sector. Must United 
Statea investment, f o r  instance, has been in manufacturing. In the 
periphery, f o r e i g n  insreafment has been concentrated in  primarJr 
production, and particularly in mining, La Swaziland, it has gone 
i n t o  the exploitation of coal and asbestos. In Botswana, it hae 
gone into coppe? and nickel. In the Pordngueat territories, 
foreijgers have been htexested  chiefly in diamonds and petmlewn, 
Noaambique, a good deal of foreign investment has gone into sugar 
as well, Some countries have begm to develop their t omis t  
resomces with foreim capital. In almost every case, however, 
foreign capitd. has tended to build on the exist* situation. 14 
has concentrated on those sectors in which a country already hae 
a "compazative advantaget\ .S tendency has the effect of 
reinforcing the pre-industrid structure of the periphery economies. 
There h, olrpiously, been increase in mufactming 
h~estment  in the -a, and especially in South Africa. But much 
of this inveshnent fails t c  contribute to tfdevelopmen+,t~. For 
w3thj.n dkte mufactming sector investment h a  been of two kinds. 
It has mne towasds the construction of facilities for pr* 
product processing and towards creating a capacity for import 
substitution h light industries. b the former ewe, it has the 
effect of strengthening to a certain extent the tendency t o  
concentrate on p x m  production. It does not lead t o  a 
qualitative shift of production. In the latter case, it provides 
capacitg f o r  production f o r  a vezy n a r m w  market, The basic 
importance of heavy Mwtry is  that it t a k e s  one along a red 
"developmentn path of gm.wth. !The pattern of inveehent taking 
place in ~outhern Africa Ss one which reflects more than anything 
else the enormous relative spending power of the white population 
aria the pull  of f o r e i s  m k e t s  in developed countries. These are 
the two forces which are shaping development in the area. And they 
are pmduchg a typicd p o l a s  pattern of economic grow-th. 
South Africa's Plans fox the Development of the Sub-Continent 
At the present moment the discussion of plans f o r  the 
ftrhme runs  in Gems of a series of ad koc agmements on various 
economic questions betweesl countries in the subcontinent.  It is 
not clear what I s  meant to come ded ia t e ly  after this stage of more 
intensive economic co-operation, LSV,for instance, provide no more 
than a sketchy idea of the meaning of rzlller economic integration in 
the middle m, h e r  the long m, however, it is clear that South 
Africa intends to attempt some kind of indicative planning fox the 
area. The principal ultimate objectives seem to be a common 
hves-tment policy asla co-ordinated public expenditure. 'Ilhe Sonth 
Africans have not stated at all clearly what policy iastmrments they 
intend t o  employ in order to achieve these objectives. The question 
we are  concerned with, however, is whether the sor ts  of  plans dluded 
'to w i l l  promote development in the b a c M  areas. For that purpose 
we ma;y asswne that -he South Africans succeed in implementing some 
form of p l m -  and that hvesbents in the region begin to confom 
I t o  some s o r t  of coherent design. We may then look a t  the 
consequences of the %est solutionIt put forward by South Africa, 
I 
The South African Government says that it wi~hes to 
promote ;%he development of +he whole region, and in particulaz that 
it w a n t s  to create jobs h the perLphery. So far, they have not 
really a d h s s e d  themselves to the aa lys i s  of that problem, except 
in a rather propagandlstic m. The analysis which is available 
suggests that they have set  themselves a much more modest goal. And 
they define the problem c o h n t i n g  the sub-continent in a most 
Intereating way. What lteconomic transfomationt', LSV ask, does the 
sub-contiaent need? (g. 34) They begin by describing the present 
regional pattern of activity as one of  exchanging labam f o r   mod^ 
which the Republic imports f r o m  the rest of the world. The peripherg, 
in other words, h p o r t ~  simple manufactured commodities or capital 
mods. It earns the m e a n s  to pay for these by sending labourers to 
South Africa. The means f o r  making the goods exported f r o m  South 
Africa be imported fmrn abroad. In some cases the goods 
themselves, perhaps in a less finished state, m t  be imported from 
Europe or the United States. 
The "targetu, LSV say, is t o  change this intm-regional 
pattern of activj-by, The present pattern is not a aesixable one. 
The "desirable pattern would be one which increased the i n t x e  
regional f l o w  of g o o d  at the expense of labour migration and t rade 
w i t h  the  rest of the world. other woMs, South hr ica  would like 
t o  reduce the imports of all countries in the region f r o m  the rest of 
the world. The sub-continent would become more self-sufficient. At 
the same time, Soukh Africa would export to the periphery more of 
the m o d s  which now have t o  be worked fm abroad. Sn return, it 
would  take more of the commodities which the periphery can WO&. 
And it would take a sufficiently larger quantidy o f  those goods t o  
permit the repatriation of m i p a t o r y  labour whose eam* presently 
f-ce peripherey b p o r b s  t o  an important extent. Such a progranme 
might well involve creation of more mufac tu rhg  capacitg in %he 
periphery. But it would be the kind of manufacturing capacity which 
ha2 been so imporbant in the past decade. It would, almost 
inevitably, be complementay to pr- production 5.n the periphery, 
although there wodd inevitably be some increase in l i g h t  
manufacturing capacity. 
This is not exactly a plan f o r  the development of the sub- 
continent. It is a plan according t o  which Soutb Africa wUl& take 
over a good deal of the economic space which European countries and 
the U i t e d  States  now occupy in southern Africa. South Africa would 
increase i ts  exports of mazlufmbd comodlities and increase i ts  
imports of primay commodities and semi-finished products. This 
would mean, essentially, a ltturning inwzds'l towards South Africa of 
the countries on the periphery. It would m e a n  only a ~~ shift 
or change in the struchme of production in other countries of the 
sbcont inent .  It would c e r t a h l y  not mean W&% aJ.1 poor countries 
crave, an enomously e v a d e d  market for the export of m a y l u f w ~ s ,  
There is m o s t  no industry in the periphery. What jnd.ustry there 
i r  certainly cannot compete with South African i n d u s t ~ .  And as 
long as there a m  mch enomoua differences in economic power 
between the two poles of  the subcontinent, it i s  exceedingly ~ ~ e l y  
*at Ghe logic  of the m k e t  place will lead anyone t o  expand the 
mufax:twbg capacity of the periphery sigmificantly, 
These facts implicit 2n the way in which official  
South African somes describe and analyse the pmblem of 
developing the ~3ubcon-t;ben.f;. What is -licit in that analysis is 
confirmed by my scmtimy of' the principles on which the future 
common investment policy of the sub-continent i s  supposed t o  be 
based. The basic prbciple  is to be lrcomparative advantagen. 
Planners must give specid considemtion t o  'Ithe cost components 
which w o u l d  indicate the r e l a t ive  comparative advantage (or  
compazative disadvantage) of location in the underdeveloped areas in 
compazison with location in the metropolitan amas of the Republic 
(W, p. 37). Thjs is the constan+ theme in  the official. analysis. 
Other criteria f o r  selecting areas of pr io r i ty  jnvesfment W: 
(l) lithe demand aspect, that is some idea of the  elasticity of 
demand for the p&icdaz productt1, and (2) Itthe availability of 
capitalH'. These a m  faixly common c r i t e r i a  f o r  the selection of 
investment projects m e r e  in a market economy. 
conchs ions 
The quention posed at the beginning of this paper was  
whether the kinds of plru~er which South Africa is apparently 
considering would, in the context of southem Africa, really lead to 
the development of the sub-conf,islentfs backwascl areas, The d e c i ~ i ~ e  
inflslences in the outcome m a t  be the present distribution of bcome 
and wealth a d  the pattern of invesiment spending in the future, 
The most m k e d  chazactezistic o f  the area as a whole is the 
skewness in the distribution of income wealth. It i s  doubtful. 
he the r  there ia such an unequal distribution of income mywhere h 
the world. Furthermore, those at the bottom end of  the income 
ajskri'13ution live in pave*, isl absolute terns. This means that 
the  mass of the people have almost no purehasing power i32 the 
m k e t ,  South Africa mi&t be proposing a stratem for development 
which would change that situation. But 311 ldicat iom a r e  that it 
is not. It is pws-g a strategy f o r  p w t h  but not development. 
And most of the growbh will take place in South Afxica. In other 
words, h the present context;, We pattern of s p e n w  proposed for 
a mothet icd .  common jnveshent policy will produce more or l e ss  the 
same results as the influx of foreign investment in t h e  last decade. 
Tt will increase the gap between the r lch and the poor in the -a. 
In other words, the countries on the periphery have a great deal t o  
Lose in an economic &on with a powexfd indus t r ia l  coun t r y  l i k e  
South Africa. 
South Africa, on the other hand, has a weat d e d  t o  gain. 
Some kind of economic d o n  would undoubtedly be a ~timulus t o  
growth in, South Af~ica. Tndustsy in the centre is already be@- 
to export important quantities of manufactured goods to Afxica. 
T o t a l  exports to the continent h 1968 were more than 270 mill ion L 
Iland. Two-thirds of that amount went t o  countries in the periphery 
a d  consisted mainly of manufactured commodities and machinew of 
various k h d s .  Countries on the periphery a r e  s t i l l  imporking 1age 
amounts of: the same kinds of goods f m m  Europe and from the United 
States. Consequently, the reorientation of t rade which South Afxica 
proposes would open up inajor new export markets f o r  i t s  industry. 
South Afxica would also make important gains t b u &  movements in the 
tema of trade. And the probable surpluses on i t s  balance of 
payments with the periphery could be used to finance the exploitation 
of thoee primary commodities of which i ts  wowing industry needs ever 
wate r  qumt i t i e s .  And, once again, the effect of this kind of 
expansion of trade a d  inveshent in the area would be to increase 
the  press= for specialization in primary production and 
complementary activitLes in the periphery. 
h t  is even more serious is that all these economic 
trends would meatlg increase the dependency on South Africa of 
periphery couatriea. The presence of impoxtat foreign capital 
jnterests S31 a poor cowtxy can never be ignored. Neither can 
tmiff arrangements or the continui~ of flow of trade. The 
expansion of economic relations, the creation of some kind of 
economic d o n  in southern Africa, would give South Africa 
considerable leverage on those countries in the area which retain 
some d e m e  of p o l i t i c a l  indlepenilence. Obviously, the depee of 
dependency would  v- f m m  cowtry t o  country; but, on the whole, 
countries would find themselves faced wi+h a very diff icul t  situation. 
Greater economic dependency vis-bvis South Africa would make them 
politically very vulnerable. South Africa is seeking closer 
association among the nations of the area becawe it l p l o w ~  that i t a  
power will make it possible to exemise an Important i n f l u w e  over 
them. That is the point of -he  whole exercise. The ult imate aZw 
of ihe n e w  economic plms m golitioal. The Common -et was, 
or ig ina l ly  to be t he  prelude to  the establishment of a C d ' c y  of 
Southem Afrioan States, The saccese of co-opemtion fox 
r~development~ would undoubtedly lead t o  the  kind^ of results 
descxibed by Rhoodie, "On its p a t  South Africa dominates tlze 
9Mrd Africa to the same, if not a greater, d e n t  than the United 
States enjoys pm-emhence in the &ericaatf (The T h i r d  mica, p.  3). 
!&at is ~carce ly  a happy pmrrpect. 
The inrplicatiom of the plans comidered here, however, 
r e d  beyond Ule ~ub-continent. The r e s u l k s  of economic union 
would undoubtedJy help to oonsolidate Soukh African power. Rcom 
the eoonomic -ts In view, new p o l i t i o d  qpemexlts, and 
especfally militazy ones, would undobtedly follow. 
stmngthening South Africa and weakening the periphery, the Common 
m k e t  would undoubtedly help t o  proteot t he  Republic again& 
attanpts to eliminate a p d e f d .  The hnplementation of these p l w  
would be a menace to the pol i t ica l  etabil i ty  of those atatea which 
oppose apa~theid aad Wch waist the national liberation mpvments 
fn the suboontbent. And the p r i m i p d  countries in queetfon, 
which w e  now attempting to form a northern alliance, sit at the 
edge of the  W mica .  ft is scazcely tmn accident that Zambia is 
included in the uEnzal list of l lpoteat id  pa3;rtnemft in +he Conrmcm 
W k e t .  
